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BANKS AND BANKING - STATES: THREE YEAR
DIVESTITURE PERIOD REQUIRED FOR CREDITOR
CORPORATION UNDER NORTH DAKOTA'S
CORPORATE FARMING STATUTE NOT
PRE-EMPTED BY THE NATIONAL BANK ACT
On September 19, 1983 Marvin D. Lutz conveyed 320 acres
of farmland to Liberty National Bank and Trust Company (Liberty
National) to avoid foreclosure of a real estate mortgage.' In Febru-
ary 1987 the State of North Dakota (State) brought this action
against Liberty National to force Liberty National to divest itself of
the farmland pursuant to subsection five of section 10-06-13 of the
North Dakota Century Code (Corporate Farming Law).2 Subsec-
tion five of the Corporate Farming Law provides that unless reten-
tion of foreclosed farmland is specifically permitted by a statutory
exception, a corporation must divest itself of the farmland within
three years after acquiring ownership.3 Liberty National moved
for summary judgement claiming that the three-year holding
period in subsection five of the Corporate Farming Law was pre-
empted by the five-year holding period in title 12 section 29 of the
United States Code (National Bank Act).4 The district court
granted Liberty National's motion for summary judgment and dis-
missed the State's claim against Liberty National.5 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that
subsection five of the Corporate Farming Law was not pre-empted
1. State v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 427 N.W.2d 307, 308 (N.D. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 393 (1988). Liberty National leased the land to Lutz with an option to
purchase from 1983 to 1986. Id. In the fall of 1986 Lutz told Liberty National that he had
quit farming and would not buy or lease the land. Id. According to the Bank, attempts to
locate purchasers did not result in any offers "for an amount which would prevent the Bank
from suffering a substantial loss on its investment." Id.
2. Id; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(5) (1985 & Supp. 1987). Section 10-06-13(5) of
the North Dakota Century Code provides:
Unless retention of the farmland or ranchland is permitted under subsection 6 or
7, all farmland or ranchland acquired as security for indebtedness, in the
collection of debts, or by the enforcement of a lien or claim shall be disposed of
within three years after acquiring ownership, if the acquisition would otherwise
violate this chapter.
Id.
3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(5) (1985 & Supp. 1987). For the text of section 10-06-
13(5) of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 2. The exceptions under
subsections six and seven of section 10-06-13 of the North Dakota Century Code allow a
retention period of greater than three years if the corporation leases with an option to
purchase or contracts for the sale of the land with the mortgagor. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-
06-13(6)-(7) (1985 & Supp. 1987). None of the exceptions to retention of farmland by a
corporation, however, applied to Liberty National. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 308.
4. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 308; National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(5) (Corporate Farming Law) (1985 & Supp. 1987):
5. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 308.
604 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:603
by the holding period found in the National Bank Act.6
The supremacy clause of article IV of the United States Con-
stitution provides Congress with the power to pre-empt state law.7
Federal law may pre-empt state law in any of the following three
ways: (1) by explicit definition; (2) by an attempt to occupy an
entire field of law; and (3) whenever there is actual conflict
between a federal and state law.8
Express pre-emption occurs when Congress unambiguously
states it is overriding state law.9 When the language of a federal
statute explicitly overrides state law, courts need not look to any
implicit intent behind the statute; rather, the courts must look
only at the plain meaning of the statute in determining a pre-emp-
tion question.10
However, when Congress has not explicitly defined whether a
state statute is pre-empted by federal law, congressional intent in
enacting the federal law must be considered. 1 Congressional
6. Id. at 315; see National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-
06-13(5) (1985 & Supp. 1987) (Corporate Farming Law). After oral argument Liberty
National sold the land involved in this lawsuit. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 308. The
North Dakota Supreme Court refused to dismiss the appeal as moot because "the issue
presented in this case is a question of great public interest and will have important
consequences in the State's future enforcement of the corporate farming laws." Id. at 309.
7. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Clause 2 of article 6 of the United States Constitution
provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in
every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
state to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986) (supremacy
clause provides congress with the power to pre-empt state law).
8. See Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984)
(discussing three ways in which federal law can pre-empt state law). See also Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1988). In Louisiana Public Service
Commission the Supreme Court found that pre-emption is justified when there is "outright
or actual conflict" between federal and state law, where there is "implicit in federal law a
barrier to state regulation," or "where congress has legislated comprehensively,. . . leaving
no room for the states to supplement federal law." Id. at 368-69.
9. See Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7, 12 (1983). In Aloha
Airlines the United States Supreme Court found that a federal statute expressly forbid
states from imposing a tax on the gross income of airlines traveling within the State. Id.
The Supreme Court indicated that courts should look to the plain meaning of the statute
when the language is direct and unambiguous. Id.
10. Id. The Court in Aloha Airlines stated that courts should look to implicit intent
only when the language is ambiguous, and thus requires a look to congressional intent. Id.
See also Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 362 (1986) (in determining express pre-emption
cases courts need not go further than the statutory language to determine whether state
law is pre-empted).
11. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983) (to determine an implied
pre-emption question one must look to Congress' intent in enacting the federal law at
issue). See also Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53
(1982Xquoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co. 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)) (pre-emption is
compelled regardless of whether Congress' command is explicit or implicit in the structure
of statute).
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intent to pre-empt state law falls under two general categories: (1)
an intent to occupy a given field of law;"2 or (2) a situation in which
state law is in actual conflict with federal law.13 The key element
needed in determining whether there is implied pre-emption,
despite the test or specific language used in an analysis, is whether
Congress intended that the federal regulations supersede state
law. 14
An intent by Congress to occupy a given field was shown to
control the pre-emption issue in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission.15 In
Pacific Gas & Electric the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether the Atomic Energy Act pre-empted the field
of law regarding nuclear power, thereby leaving regulation under
exclusive federal control.' 6 The Court held that the entire field of
law concerning nuclear safety was occupied by federal law. 17 The
Court stated that when a given field is occupied by the federal
government, federal law will pre-empt state law in the entire field,
12. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145, 1150 (1988). In
Schneidewind the Supreme Court noted that Congress has indicated an intent to occupy a
given field where the pervasiveness of the federal regulations precludes supplementation
by the state, or where "the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the
character of obligations imposed by it . . . reveal the same purpose." Id. (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
13. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984). State law need not be
entirely displaced by federal law in order to find federal pre-emption. Id. Pre-emption of
state law will only occur to the extent that state law actually conflicts with federal law. Id.
14. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1988) ("[t]he critical
question in any pre-emption analysis is always whether Congress intended that the federal
regulation supersede state law"). See also Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947). In Rice the Supreme Court recognized that in considering a question of federal pre-
emption Congress may choose to regulate an entire field, share the task of regulation with
the states, or adopt the state scheme as federal policy. Id. The Court stated that one must
look to Congress' purpose in enacting the legislation to determine which case applies to a
particular area of law. Id. See also Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477
U.S. 1, 6 (1986). In Wardair Canada Inc. the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he first and fundamental inquiry in any pre-emption analysis is whether
Congress intended to displace state law, and where a congressional statute does
not expressly declare that state law is to be pre-empted, and where there is no
actual conflict between what federal law and state law prescribe, we have
required that there be evidence of a congressional intent to pre-empt the
specific field covered by the state law.
Id.
15. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
16. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1983). Pacific Gas & Electric concerned California's
imposition of a moratorium on certification of new nuclear power plants until a
demonstrated technology or means could be found for the permanent disposal of nuclear
wastes. Id. at 198. Petitioner electric utility companies contended that the State's
moratorium was invalid under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, through which the federal
government maintains control of the safety and "nuclear" aspects of nuclear power
generation. Id. at 198, 212. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(K) (1982) (states may regulate nuclear
power plants for "purposes other than protection against radiation hazards").
17. Pacific Gas & Electric, 461 U.S. at 212.
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except for those limited powers expressly left to the states."8 The
Court concluded that the test of pre-emption for a given field is
whether "the matter on which the state asserts the right to act is in
any way regulated by the Federal Act."19 However, the Court
held that California's imposition of a moratorium on certification
of new power plants was not pre-empted by the Atomic Energy
Act because the intent of the Act was to regulate safety aspects
involved in the construction and operation of the plant and not the
economic question of whether the plant should be built.20
Even where Congress has not manifested the intent to pre-
empt a given field of law, the state law will be pre-empted to the
extent it actually conflicts with federal law.2 No rigid formula or
rule has been established to determine what constitutes an actual
conflict between state and federal law.22 However, two standards
have predominantly been used by the courts in determining
whether the challenged state law is pre-empted by federal law.2 3
Under the two standards developed by the courts, an actual con-
flict arises when "compliance with both federal and state law is a
physical impossibility" 24 or where state law "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress [Hines test]."
25
18. Id. at 212-13 (when an entire field is occupied the test of pre-emption is whether
"the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the
Federal Act.") (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947)). In Rice
the United States Supreme Court stated that state law need not necessarily conflict with
federal law in order to find pre-emption. Rice, 331 U.S. at 236. The Court stated that
federal law will control when Congress acts "so unequivocally as to make clear that it
intends no regulation except its own." Id.
19. Pacific Gas 6 Electric, 461 U.S. at 212-213 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947)).
20. Id. at 205-08.
21. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (federal law will pre-
empt state law if compliance with both is physically impossible or where the state law
stands as an obstacle to the objectives of federal law).
22. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). In Hines the United States
Supreme Court stated that the very nature of the implied pre-emption problem prohibits
the use of a "universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of
Congress." Id. The Court stated "in considering the validity of state laws in light of treaties
or federal laws touching the same subject, [this court] has made use of the following
expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference;
irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference." Id. (footnotes and
citations omitted).
23. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
24. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). The
Court in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers stated that state law will be pre-empted by
federal law to the extent that compliance with each law is impossible. Id. However, the
Court noted that pre-emption does not necessarily occur just because both federal and state
law address a particular area of law. Id. at 142. For instance in Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers the Court held that the state law was not pre-empted even though it was more
restrictive than the federal law. Id. at 141.
25. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. In Hines the Supreme Court implied that it would look to the
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The Supreme Court considered whether an actual conflict
existed between a state and federal law in Florida Lime & Avo-
cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul.26 In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers
the United States Supreme Court upheld a California statute
which placed stricter standards on the marketing of avocados
within California than was required under federal regulations.27
This determination upholding the validity of the state statute was
based on the Hines test; i.e., does the state law stand as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress?2 8 In particular, the Supreme Court asked
whether there was a congressional intent to occupy the entire field
of marketing avocados or whether an actual conflict existed
between the State and federal marketing requirements.29
In determining whether Congress intended to displace the
entire field of marketing avocados, the Court considered both the
nature of the subject matter (maturity of avocados) and any
explicit declarations made by Congress to displace state regula-
tion.3 ° The marketing of avocados was found by the Court to be a
subject traditionally within the scope of state supervision because
of the strong state interest in protecting consumers against decep-
tion in retail markets.3 Thus, the Court determined the that sub-
ject matter was not one which required exclusive regulation by
the federal government.3 2 In addition, an examination by the
purpose of the entire scheme of the federal act to determine the pre-emption issue. Id. at
n. 20 (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)). The Court acknowledges that state
law must yield to federal law if the purpose of the act cannot be accomplished; for example
if a state law frustrates the purpose of a federal law or if the provisions of the act are not
given their natural effect. Id. See also Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers and Hines, the court found that actual conflict exists where compliance is
physically impossible or where state law stands as an obstacle to the objectives of federal
law).
26. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
27. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963). The
debate in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers stemmed from laws designed to determine the
maturity of avocados. Id. at 133-34. California measured maturity using an oil-to-weight
ratio while federal marketing orders determined maturity based upon the picking date and
the size and weight of the avocado. Id. The result of the California requirement was to
exclude a small fraction of Florida avocados from California markets which met federal
marketing requirements. Id. at 136.
28. Id. at 141; see Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. For a discussion of the federal pre-emption test
as formulated by the Court in Hines, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
29. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 141-43.
30. Id. at 143.
31. Id. at 144. The Court noted that states have a legitimate interest in protecting
citizens against fraud and deception in food markets within that state. Id. In addition, the
Court found the marketing of avocados to be an unlikely area to warrant exclusive federal
regulation. Id. at 143. The Court stated that the maturity of avocados is not a subject which
lends itself to exclusive national supervision, nor is it an area of vital interest demanding
uniformity throughout the nation. Id. at 143-44.
32. Id. at 143.
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Court of the Congressional purpose in enacting the statute
revealed that the standards established were meant to be mini-
mum standards. 3  Therefore, the Court concluded that no specific
intent to displace state regulation had been shown. 4
Finding no specific intent to displace state law in the field of
the marketing of avocados, the Court considered whether compli-
ance with both the federal and state law was a physical impossibil-
ity, and thus, in actual conflict with the federal marketing order.35
The federal marketing order tested the maturity of the avocados
based upon the picking dates and minimum size and weight
requirements.3 6 Conversely, California's statute based maturity
solely upon the testing of the oil to weight ratio of the avocado.37
The Court stated that compliance with both the federal and state
requirements was not physically impossible because the Florida
avocado varieties marketed in California could meet or exceed the
California oil content requirement and still be in compliance with
the federal date, size, and weight restrictions.3 8 Therefore, the
Supreme Court held that the California statute was not pre-
empted by federal law.3 9
Coupled with the strong emphasis placed upon congressional
intent is an overriding reluctance for court's to infer pre-emp-
tion.40 This reluctance stems from the "Supreme Court's repeated
emphasis on the central role of Congress in protecting the sover-
33. Id. at 147. See 7 U.S.C. § 602(3) (1982) (standards under this title are to be
"minimum standards of quality and maturity.., as will effectuate such orderly marketing
in the public interest").
34. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 147-48. The Court stated that "there
is neither such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand
in the same area, nor evidence of congressional design to pre-empt the field." Id. at 141.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 139. The federal regulations forbid the picking of avocados before a
prescribed date. Id. See 7 C.F.R. § 969.53 (Supp. 1955) (superseded by 7 C.F.R. § 915.53
(1988) (provides exemptions to any grower who can show that his avocados are mature prior
to the time they may be picked under federal regulation). However, because the ultimate
goal of the statute was to ensure that avocados were mature when picked, the Court noted
that exemptions to the prescribed picking date may be granted upon a showing that a
particular variety will meet maturity prior to the prescribed date. Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, 373 U.S. at 139.
37. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 133-34. California's Agricultural
Code prohibited the transportation or sale of avocados in California which contained less
than 8 per cent oil, by weight of the avocado, excluding the skin and seeds. Id. See CAL.
AGRIC. CODE § 792 (West 1954) (repealed 1967).
38. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 143. The Supreme Court indicated
that the possibility that the avocados could meet the federal maturity requirements prior to
reaching the California oil content minimum did not render compliance physically
impossible. Id.
39. Id. at 152.
40. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) ("[c]onsideration under the
Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace
state law."); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1979) (Supreme Court
generally reluctant to infer pre-emption).
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eignty of the states."4 1 In the final analysis, "the question whether
federal law in fact pre-empts state action in any given case neces-
sarily remains largely a matter of statutory construction. ' 42 How-
ever, the burden of persuasion is on the party claiming that
Congress intended to pre-empt state law.43
The National Bank Act,44 as enacted in 1864, prohibited
national banking associations from holding onto real estate for
more than a five-year period.4' The Supreme Court has found that
the object of the restrictions of the National Bank Act were three-
fold: 1) to keep capital flowing; 2) to deter banks from real estate
speculation; and 3) to prevent accumulation of large masses of
property.46 The Supreme Court has also stated, as have various
state courts, that the purpose of the five-year holding period plac-
ing limitations on the power of national banks to invest in real
estate is to protect bank depositors and stockholders from specula-
tion or risky investments.47 The North Dakota Supreme Court has
41. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 479-80 (2d ed. 1988). An
inference against pre-emption is justifiable for the protection of state sovereignty. Id. at
480.
42. Id. at 480.
43. Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 37 Cal. 3d. 540, -, 691 P.2d. 630, 634, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 874, 878 (1984) (party claiming pre-emption must prove it). Cf. New York Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1972) (states must be allowed "considerable
latitude" in resolving social problems).
44. Ch. 106, 13 stat. 99-113 (1864).
45. National Banks, ch. 1, (1878) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982)). Section
5137 provides:
A national banking association may purchase, hold, and convey real estate for the
following purposes, and for no others: First. Such as shall be necessary for its
immediate accommodation in the transaction of its business. Second. Such as
shall be mortgaged to it in good faith by way of security for debts previously
contracted. Third. Such as shall be conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts
previously contracted in the course of its dealings. Fourth. Such as it shall
purchase at sales under judgments, decrees, or mortgages held by the
association, or shall purchase to secure debts due to it. But no such association
shall hold the possession of any real estate under mortgage, or the title and
possession of any real estate purchased to secure any debts due to it, for a longer
period than five years.
Id. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 1983).
The court of appeals in First National Bank noted that the National Bank Act described
"four exclusive categories of real property that a bank can purchase, hold, or convey." Id.
at 682. The five-year limitation applies to property falling within one of these four catego-
ries that was purchased or mortgaged to secure debts due the bank. Id. National banks are
not authorized to hold property falling outside the four categories. Id. Thus, the court of
appeals concluded that the five-year limitation period was meant to limit the four catego-
ries and not expand them. Id.
46. National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.S. 621, 626 (1879).
47. See, e.g., Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 49 (1940) (restrictions placed
on national banks limiting investment in real estate are to safeguard customers and
stockholders from risky investments); Central Nat'l Bank v. Fleetwood Realty Corp., 110 IlI.
App. 3d 169, -, 441 N.E.2d 1244, 1250-51 (1982) (limitations on the power of national
banks to invest in real estate are to "protect bank depositors and stockholders from risky
investments"); Exchange Bank v. Meadors, 199 Okla. 10, -, 184 P.2d 458, 463 (1947)
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indicated that the purpose of placing such limitations upon
national banks is primarily for the protection of depositors. 48
The five-year holding period adopted in the 1864 National
Bank Act is still applicable today.49 However, amendments
adopted in 1980 and 1982 allow the Comptroller of the Currency
to.extend the holding of real estate beyond the five-year limitation
if: (1) the bank has made a good faith effort to sell the real estate; or
(2) requiring disposal within the five-year limitation would be det-
rimental to the bank.50 The extension allows a bank up to an addi-
tional five years to divest itself of the real estate.5 1 The National
Bank Act was amended to provide this extension because the
Comptroller expressed concern that depressed economic condi-
tions might force a bank to dispose of real estate at prices that did
not reflect the bank's investment.
52
North Dakota adopted a corporate farming law in 1932
prohibiting corporations from holding real estate unless necessary
for the conducting of business.5 3 In 1933 the corporate farming
(purpose of provisions of section 29 of title 12 of the United States Code is to prevent
speculation in real estate).
48. See Smith v. Rennix, 52 N.D. 935, 943-44, 204 N.W. 843, 844 (N.D. 1925). The
North Dakota Supreme Court in Smith stated that the regulatory measures which limit the
holding of real estate by national banking associations are intended primarily for the
protection of depositors. Id. The court reasoned that banks would not be in a position to
meet obligations of depositors if bank assets were tied up in real estate holdings. Id. See
also Jaiski v. Farmers and Merchants State Bank, 53 N.D. 470, 477-78, 206 N.W. 773, 776
(N.D. 1925) (contract by bank to purchase land was held void as contrary to statute whose
purpose was to protect depositors).
49. See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982). Section 29 of title 12 of the United
States Code provides in relevant part:
But no such association shall hold the possession of any real estate under
mortgage, or the title and possession of any real estate purchased to secure any
debts due to it, for a longer period than five years except as otherwise provided
in this section.
For real estate in the possession of a national banking association upon
application by the association, the Comptroller of the Currency may approve the
possession of any such real estate by such association for a period longer than five
years, but not to exceed an additional five years, if (1) the association has made a
good faith attempt to dispose of the real estate within the five-year period, or (2)
disposal within the five-year period would be detrimental to the association.
Id. In addition, section 29 of title 12 of the United States Code allows a national bank to
hold interest in real estate for a longer period than five years if: (1) the real estate had been
acquired prior to October 15, 1982, (2) the real estate had not been valued on the bank's
books for more than a nominal amount (as of December 31, 1979), and (3) if state law would
permit a state chartered bank to hold real estate for a longer period. Id. If these conditions




52. See 125 CONG. REC. 14,599 (1979) (letter from John G. Hermann to William
Proxmire, May 31, 1979, discussing concern over the five-year divestiture period placed
upon national banks which have foreclosed on real estate).
53. Prohibiting Corporation Farming, 1933 N.D. Laws 494, § 1. The initiated measure
provided:
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law was modified disallowing real estate ownership by corpora-
tions entirely. 4 In 1981 a law was enacted to allow corporate
farming or ranching for only family farms.5 5 The current version
of North Dakota's corporate farming law is found in chapter 10-06
of the North Dakota Century Code.5 6
Section 10-06-01 of the North Dakota Century Code provides
that "[a]ll corporations, except as otherwise provided in this chap-
ter, are prohibited from owning or leasing land used for farming or
ranching and from engaging in the business of farming or ranch-
ing."57 Exceptions to section 10-06-01 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code are set forth in the Corporate Farming Law.58
Subsection four of the Corporate Farming Law allows corporations
to acquire farmland as security for indebtedness through process
of law for the collection of debts, or by lien or claim subject to
divestiture requirements under subsections four through seven of
the Corporate Farming Law.5 9
That all corporations, both domestic and foreign, except as otherwise provided
in this act, are hereby prohibited ... from acquiring or holding real estate in
excess of that necessary for the conduct of their business, unless the same is
acquired in the course of their business by judicial process or operation of law.
Id. See Note, North Dakota's Corporate Farming Statute: An Analysis of the Recent
Change in the Law, 58 N.D.L. REv. 283, 284-87 (1982) (provides an analysis of the history of
corporate farming in North Dakota and describes requirements for farming in the corpo-
rate form pursuant to the 1981 amendment to North Dakota's corporate farming law
allowing family farms to incorporate).
54. See Corporations, ch. 89, 1933 N.D. Laws 119, 122-23. Chapter 89, § 1 provides:
"That all corporations, both domestic and foreign, except as otherwise provided in this act,
are hereby prohibited from engaging in the business of farming or agriculture." Id.
55. See Corporations, ch. 134, 1981 N.D. Laws 309-10. The 1981 amendment to the
corporate farming statute allows corporate farming or ranching if: (1) the corporation has 15
shareholders or less, (2) each shareholder is related to each of the other shareholders, (3)
each shareholder is an individual with certain limited exceptions for trusts and estates; (4)
each individual member is a citizen or permanent resident alien of the United States, (5) the
officers and directors are actively engaged in fanning, and (6) other statutory requirements
are met with respect to the corporation's gross income and earnings. Id.
56. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-06-01 to -15 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-01 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
58. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13 (1985 & Supp. 1987). For the text of subsection 5 of
section 10-06-13 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 2. For an explanation
of the exceptions provided for under subsection 5 of section 10-06-13 of the North Dakota
Century Code allowing an interest in real estate to be held by a corporation, see supra note
3.
59. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(4) to -(7) (1985 & Supp. 1987). Subsection four of
section 10-06-13 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
Subject to the divestiture requirements of subsections 5, 6, and 7, a domestic or
foreign corporation may acquire farmland or ranchland as security for
indebtedness, by process of law in the collection of debts, or by any procedure
for the enforcement of a lien or claim thereon, whether created by mortgage or
otherwise.
N.D. Cent. Code § 10-06-13(4) (1985 & Supp. 1987). For the text of section 10-06-13(5) of
the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 2. Subsections six and seven of section 10-
06-13 of the North Dakota Century Code allow a corporation to retain land past the three
year divestment period where the corporation leases with an option to purchase or con-
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The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed whether the
National Bank Act superseded North Dakota's corporate farming
law in State v. Liberty National Bank & Trust.60 Liberty National
failed to divest itself of farmland that it had acquired through fore-
closure within the three-year time limitation permitted under the
Corporate Farming Law.6' Liberty National contended that the
three-year divestiture period contained in the Corporate Farming
Law was not applicable to national banks.62 Rather, Liberty
National contended that national banks should be subject to the
five-year limitation prescribed in the National Bank Act because
an actual conflict existed between the real estate holding limita-
tions imposed by the National Bank Act (five-year limitation) and
those imposed by North Dakota's Corporate Farming Law (three-
year limitation).63 Thus, Liberty National asserted that the three-
year holding period in the Corporate Farming Law was pre-
empted by the National Bank Act's five-year limitation.64 Liberty
National's second contention focused on the interaction of North
Dakota's corporate farming statute with the laws of North Dakota
governing state banks. 65  Section 6-03-09 of the North Dakota
Century Code grants state banks a five-year divestiture period in
tracts for the sale of the land with the mortgagor. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(6) -(7) (1985
& Supp. 1987).
60. 427 N.W.2d 307, 308 (N.D. 1988).
61. State v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust, 427 N.W.2d 307, 308 (N.D. 1988); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 10-13-06(5) (1958 & Supp. 1987).
62. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 308.
63. Id. See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(5)
(1985 & Supp. 1987) (subsection on enforcement of corporate farming laws). Liberty
National did not contend that any of the exceptions under section 10-06-13 of the North
Dakota Century Code applied. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 308; N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 10-06-13(6X7) (1985 & Supp. 1987). After oral argument, Liberty National informed the
supreme court that the land in issue had been sold. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 308.
The supreme court did not consider the case moot because the issue presented "is a
question of great public interest and will have important consequences in the State's future
enforcement of the corporate farming laws." Id. at 309.
64. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 at 308. See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(5) (1985 & Supp. 1987) (subsection on enforcement of corporate
farming laws).
65. Liberty Nat'! Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 315. Exemption to North Dakota's corporate
farming laws is codified in 10-06-13(5) of the North Dakota Century Code. N.D. CENT.
CODE. § 10-06-13 (1985 & Supp. 1987) (corporations in North Dakota are subject to a three-
year divestiture period for farmland). For the text of subsections four and five of section 10-
06-13 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra notes 2 & 59. The laws governing state
banks real estate holdings are codified in section 6-03-09 of the North Dakota Century
Code. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 6-03-09 (1987). Section 6-03-09 of the North Dakota Century
Code provides:
No banking association may hold the possession of any real estate under
mortgage, nor title and possession of any real estate purchased to satisfy
indebtedness, for a longer period than five years from the date of acquiring title
thereto unless such time has been extended by certificate of the commissiomer
[sic].
Id. The North Dakota Century Code excludes national banks from the definition of "bank-
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which to dispose of real estate.66 Before Liberty National, it was
unclear whether state banks would be subject to a three-year
divestiture period under the Corporate Farming Law or a five-
year divestiture period under section 6-03-09 of the North Dakota
Century Code; the two laws being in conflict and no legislative
guidance as to the applicable divestiture period. Liberty National
contended that if federal banks are subject to the three-year hold-
ing period under the Corporate Farming Law and assuming state
banks would be subject the five-year holding period found in sec-
tion 6-03-09 of the North Dakota Century Code, then state banks
would have a competitive advantage over federal banks.67 The
State of North Dakota contended that national banks must yield to
State law governing corporate real estate holdings, notwithstand-
ing the provisions of the National Bank Act, because no actual con-
flict existed between the State and federal law and compliance
with both federal and State law was physically possible.68
The supreme court stated that the inquiry to determine if an
actual conflict exists is "whether the state law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."'69 The court noted that the determination
of whether an actual conflict exists rests largely on the purpose of
each statute's enactment.7 ° In looking to the enactment of the
National Bank Act, the court found that the primary congressional
purpose was to prevent banks from becoming monopolistic hold-
ers of property.71 The supreme court recognized three primary
objectives which the National Bank Act purports to establish: (1) to
keep capital flowing; (2) to deter banks from investing in hazard-
ing association" for purposes of title 6. N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-01-02(1) (1987). Thus, Liberty
National would not be governed by section 6-03-09 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id.
66. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 315. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-09 (1987).
For the text of section 6-03-09 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 65.
67. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 315. Liberty National contented that State
banks would have a competitive advantage because they would be subject to a five-year
divestiture period while national banks would have a three-year period. Id.
68. Brief for Appellant at 12, State v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 427 N.W.2d 307
(1988XNo. 870256Xavailable at the University of North Dakota Law Library). See National
Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(5) (1985 & Supp. 1987)
(subsection on enforcement of corporate farming laws).
69. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 314. For a discussion of what constitutes an
actual conflict between a state and federal law, see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying
text.
70. id.
71. Id. at 312. See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982). The North Dakota
Supreme Court's determination of the purpose of the divestiture period found in the
National Bank Act was based primarily on United States Supreme Court cases and in
looking to the legislative history of the statute prior to it's enactment. Id. at 311-12. For a
discussion of the United States Supreme Court's analysis of the five-year divestiture period
found in the National Bank Act, see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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ous real estate speculation; and (3) to prevent the accumulation of
large quantities of real estate.
7 2
The court found that the purpose of the anti-corporate farm-
ing law was to prevent lending institutions and insurance compa-
nies from foreclosing on thousands of acres of land during the
depression. 73  The supreme court recognized that repeated
attempts to allow corporate farming by families succeeded in
1981." However, the ban on ownership of agricultural land by
non-family corporations engaged in farming has remained intact.7
After looking to the history of each statute, the court noted
that the primary purpose of each law was to prevent banks and
corporations from becoming monopolistic holders of real estate. 6
The court further noted that the secondary goals of each law were
similar.77 The secondary goals of the statutes were to provide a
measure of protection to banks and corporations through reason-
able divestiture periods. 78 Because the primary and secondary
objectives of each law were found to be substantially the same, the
North Dakota Supreme Court found that the Corporate Farming
Law was not repugnant to the purposes and objectives of the
National Bank Act.7 9 Therefore, the supreme court found that
section 10-06-13(5) of the North Dakota Century Code was not an
obstacle to the purposes of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. sec-
tion 29, and thus concluded that no actual conflict existed between
the two laws.8 ° Thus, the court held that the National Bank Act
72. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d. at 311 (citing National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.S.
621 (1878)).
73. Id. at 313. See Prohibiting Corporation Farming, 1933 N.D. Laws 494 § 1. For the
text of section one of the 1933 N.D. Laws 494 § 1, see supra note 53.
74. See Note, supra note 53, at 288.
75. See Note, supra note 53, at 288.
76. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 314. See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 29
(1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(5) (1985 & Supp. 1987) (subsection on enforcement of
corporate farming laws).
77. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 314-15. See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 29
(1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(5) (1985 & Supp. 1987) (subsection on enforcement of
corporate farming laws).
78. Liberty Natl Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 315. See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 29
(1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(5) (1985 & Supp. 1987) (subsection on enforcement of
corporate farming laws).
79. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 314-15. See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 29
(1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13 (1985 & Supp. 1987) (subsection on enforcement of
corporate farming laws). To determine whether an actual conflict between the state and
federal law existed, the North Dakota Supreme Court looked to the test formulated in
Hines. LIBERTY NAT'L BANK, 427 N.W.2d at 309-10, 315. The Hines test asks whether the
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). For a
discussion of the Hines test see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
80. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 314-15. See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 29
(1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(5) (1985 & Supp. 1987) (subsection on enforcement of
corporate farming laws). The state law imposed a more stringent divestiture period upon a
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did not pre-empt the Corporate Farming Law. 1
After finding that the Corporate Farming Law was not pre-
empted by the National Bank Act, the supreme court considered
Liberty National's contention that state banks would have a com-
petitive advantage over national banks (assuming state banks
would be subject to a five-year divestiture period under section 6-
09-03 of the North Dakota Century Code while national banks
would be subject to a three-year divestiture period under the Cor-
porate Farming Law).82 This consideration required the court to
look at whether a state bank in North Dakota is subject to the
three-year divestiture period found in the Corporate Farming
Law or the five-year divestiture period under section 6-03-09 of
the North Dakota Century Code.8 3 Section 6-03-09 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides that "[state] banking associations"
must divest of real estate within five years of acquisition. 4 Section
10-06-13(4X5) of the North Dakota Century Code requires "corpo-
rations" (which would include state banks) to divest of farmland
within three years.8 5 Thus, both laws are applicable to state banks
which have an interest in farmland or ranchland, creating a con-
flict as to the appropriate divestiture period. 6 In resolving the
conflict, the court examined section 1-02-07 of the North Dakota
national bank than would be required under federal law. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d
at 315. The supreme court noted that the difference in the time periods allowed before
divestiture represented "the respective legislative bodies reasonable choices of appropriate
divestiture periods." Id. at 315. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the fact that
both choices are reasonable and were made with the same policy considerations in mind
was evidence that the state and federal laws were not in actual conflict with one another.
Id. at 314-15.
81. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 315.
82. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 315-16. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(5)
(1985 & Supp. 1987) (subsection on enforcement of corporate farming laws); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 6-03-09 (1987) (holding of Real Estate-Limitation). For the text of section 6-03-09 of
the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 65. Section 6-03-09 of the North Dakota
Century Code allows state banks five years to divest of real estate. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427
N.W.2d at 315. If national banks are held to a three-year divestiture period under section
10-06-13(5) of the North Dakota Century Code, state banks would have the advantage of
two additional years to divest themselves of real estate. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-
06-13(5) (1985 & Supp. 1987) (requiring a three-year divestiture period for corporations)
with N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-09 (1985) (allowing state banks five-year divestiture period).
83. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 315-16. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(5)
(1985 & Supp. 1987) (subsection on enforcement of corporate farming laws); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 6-03-09 (1987) (holding of Real Estate-Limitation).
84. N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-09 (1987) (holding of Real Estate-Limitation). For the text
of section 6-03-09 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 65.
85. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(4X5) (1985 & Supp. 1987) (Corporate Farming Law).
While the North Dakota Century Code does permit certain organizations to own farmland,
state banks do not fall under an exception to the general prohibition against corporations
owning farmland. Id.
86. Liberty Natl Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 315. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(5) (1985
& Supp. 1987) (subsection on enforcement of corporate farming laws); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 6-03-09 (1987) (holding of Real Estate-Limitation).
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Century Code which states that if two laws are in irreconcilable
conflict, the law which is considered a "special" provision (i.e., one
confined to a particular purpose) will prevail over one considered
a "general" provision.8 7 However, the court found that section 1-
02-07 of the North Dakota Century Code was not controlling
because each law was considered a "special" provision; the Corpo-
rate Farming Law as to "farmland or ranchland" and section 6-03-
09 of the North Dakota Century Code as to "banking
associations. "88
Because section 1-02-07 of the North Dakota Century Code
was not controlling, the court concluded that the statute enacted
most recently would determine the applicable law.89 The deter-
mination by the court that the more recent statute prevails was
based in part on section 1-02-08 of the North Dakota Century
Code, which provides that conflicting clauses found in the same
statute are reconciled using the clause "last in order of date or
position."90 The court found the Corporate Farming Law, the
more recent enactment, to be controlling; therefore, state banks
would be held to a three-year divestiture period.9' Thus, the court
found that state banks do not have a competitive advantage over
87. Liberty Natl Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 315. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-07 (1987)
("whenever a general provision in a statute is in conflict with a special provision . .. the
special provision must prevail and must be construed as an exception to the general
provision,..."). Id. The words in any statute of the North Dakota Century Code are to be
understood in their ordinary sense. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-02 (1987). In this light, the
word "special" has been defined as "confined to a particular purpose, object, person, or
class." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1253 (5th ed. 1979).
88. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 315. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13 (1985 &
Supp. 1987) (subsection on enforcement of corporate farming law); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-
03-09 (1987) (holding of Real Estate-Limitation); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-07 (1987) (special
provision prevails over general provision when the two provisions are irreconcilable). The
court concluded that section 1-02-07 of the North Dakota Century Code was not controlling
because each section was considered both a special and a general provision. Liberty Nat'l
Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 315. The divestiture period found in Section 10-06-13 of the North
Dakota Century Code is "general" in the sense that it governs corporations and "special"
with respect to control over farmland and ranchland. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13
(1985 & Supp. 1987). For the text of subsection 5 of section 10-06-13 of the North Dakota
Century Code, see supra note 2. In the same manner, the divestiture period found in
Section 6-03-09 of the North Dakota Century Code is "general" in the sense that it governs
real estate and "special" with respect to control over banking associations. Liberty Nat'l
Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 315. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-09 (1985 & Supp. 1987). For the
text of section 6-03-09 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 65. See also
Northwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Baumgartner, 136 N.W.2d 640, 643 (N.D. 1965) (section
1-02-07 of the North Dakota Century Code is not applicable where both statutes are
considered "special" provisions).
89. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 316. See Kershaw v. Burleigh County, 77 N.D.
932, 936, 47 N.W.2d 132, 135 (1951) (where two irreconcilable statutes exist, the subsequent
enactment is the later declaration of legislative will and should prevail).
90. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-08 (1987) (conflicting clauses within a statute should be
reconciled by looking to the clause in the last position or with the last date).
91. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 316. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13 (1985 &
Supp. 1987) (enacted in 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-09 (1987) (enacted in 1890).
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national banks.92  The decision by the North Dakota Supreme
Court finding that the Corporate Farming Law is not pre-empted
by the National Bank Act raises questions concerning the enforce-
ment of North Dakota's corporate farming statute. Subsection one
of the Corporate Farming Law subjects a corporation to dissolu-
tion should it fail to comply with a court order to divest itself of
real estate.93 Whether the State has the power to dissolve a
national bank for non-compliance with the Corporate Farming
Law has not been determined.
A second concern regarding Liberty National Bank decision is
its affect upon the availability of credit within North Dakota.
Lending institutions are becoming increasingly wary of agricul-
tural loans because of deflated land and commodity prices and the
increasing cost of production.9 4 The requirement of a three-year
divestiture period is yet another factor institutions will be forced
to consider in agricultural lending - and the tightening of credit
for farmers is not what North Dakota's corporate farming statute
envisioned.
Ronald 0. Zink
92. Liberty Natl Bank, 427 N.W.2d at 316.
93. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(1) (1985 & Supp. 1987). Subsection 1 of section 10-
06-13 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in relevant part that "[any corporation
that fails to comply with the court's order [of dissolution] is subject to a civil penalty not to
exceed twenty-five thousand dollars and may be dissolved by the secretary of state." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-06-13(1) (1985 & Supp. 1987). Subsection 10 of section 10-06-13 provides
that "[any corporation continuing to violate this chapter ... may be dissolved by the
attorney general in accordance with the laws of this state." N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-
13(10) (1985 & Supp. 1987).
94. The National Bank Act was amended in 1982 to allow an extension of the five-year
divestiture period because of deflated land prices. Garns-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, title 4, § 413, 96 stat. 1521 (1983). For a discussion
of congressional purpose behind the amendment see supra notes 52 and accompanying
text.
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